When Minorities are 99%. The Lost Currency of Anti-Discrimination Law. Insights from Europe by Niccolai S
Fascicolo 2 | 2015
I DIRITTI DEI DETENUTI
When Minorities are 99%. The Lost Currency




 When Minorities are 99%. The Lost
Currency of Anti-Discrimination Law -
Insights from Europe(*)
di SILVIA NICCOLAI
Ordinario di Diritto costituzionale - Università degli Studi di Cagliari
ABSTRACT
By discussing two components of the ‘universalistic and dignitarian turn’ that
anti-discrimination law is facing both in the Us and in Europe, this paper
suggests that what is making traditional anti-discrimination old and no longer
in tune with contemporary needs and ways of thinking is its paternalistic,
though progressive, aim, reflected in its utilitarian, instrumental and skeptical
matrix. This has made anti-discrimination, up to now, capable of seeing
minorities as problem-bearers or as interest-bearers, but incapable of seeing
them as equal participants in the research of just, fair, and changeable




1. The first component of the universal and dignitarian turn:  improving the
efficiency of Equal Protection as a social policy. 2. The European Scenery. A)
The European Union. 3. B) The European Convention of Human Rights. 4. The
second component of the universal and dignitarian turn: improving the quality
of the nondiscrimination principle as an instrument of legal evaluation. 5.
Stepping backwards: the utilitarian matrix of anti-discrimination protection in
question. 6. Anti-caste principle vs equitableness: anti-discrimination as
triumphant skepticism towards law. 7. Turning to dignity in the name of
efficiency? 8. Beyond the commutative rationale of anti-discrimination. 9.
Towards the ‘justice of the honors’. 10. Turning to dignity in another way:
dignity as a quest for more (e)quality in anti-discrimination reasoning.
 
 
1. The  first component of universal and dignitarian turn. Improving the
efficiency of Equal Protection as a social policy. Anti-discrimination law is
facing a universal and dignitarian turn[1]. This, apparently, attacks the very
foundation of anti-discrimination, which is according protection to some social
groups, on the basis that they have been the victims of historical harm. The
new parameter of dignity is expected to address some specific problems that
traditional group based anti-discrimination protection leaves unsolved, or even
raises, in the ever more complex and diverse contemporary societies. The shift
to dignity warns us that something, in traditional anti-discrimination
protection, is becoming outdated, not in tune with contemporary needs or ways
of thinking.  But what, exactly, is it?
In order to tackle this question, let’s start by examining the universal and
dignitarian turn, which  gathers  opinions of two trends. On the one side there
is the emblematic position expressed in 2011 by K. Y oshino, who accused
American Equal Protection, the mother of all anti-discriminatory protections,
to cause balkanization and backlash[2]. In order to avoid these risks, the
Supreme Court should privilege only those claims that are universal, or that
can be formulated in universal terms (not ‘gay marriage’ but ‘marriage for all’).
These pertain to human dignity, understood as synthesis of those liberties that
are basic for the personal development of individuals. ‘Liberty-dignity claims’,
Y oshino maintains, create empathy and cohesion, in that they encourage the
majority to share minority claims, and should be favored. The Supreme Court
and the judiciary should instead desert the purely redistributive claims put
forward by this or that group and aiming to secure special rights or status.
These are better to be abandoned to politics. Differently from the judiciary,
political bodies, which are naturally irrational, do not suffer from being exposed
to minority claims, in their turn naturally irrational, but can try to take
advantage of them in the ballots game. The ancient Equal Protection/Due
Process interpretative machinery, as tiered scrutiny and suspect classes, should
be reserved only to those issues which are fundamental indeed but incapable of
universalization, because they are irremediably ‘partial’. Exemplum of these
‘equality-dignity claims’ is abortion, which, Y oshino says, concerns women
only because of  biology.
A similar point of view was expressed, for the UK, by Allen and Moon in 2006.
These authors think that when groups are too many, and each of them want
their identity to be recognized, conflicts are increasingly complex and difficult to
solve. Saying that a discrimination is an offence to dignity (instead than an
adverse treatment that disfavors someone in comparison with someone else),
would reduce litigation. The proof of the offence to dignity being more difficult,
potential plaintiffs are discouraged. ‘Dignity’ would also help to re-set anti-
discriminatory claims around those offences to self-esteem and respect that can
be considered ‘objectively’ so, in light of the idea of normality shared by
‘ordinary members of society’[3].
This first group of opinions suggests that anti-discrimination is becoming
outdated because it is no longer an efficient tool. When groups asking for
recognition and protection proliferate,  the anti-discrimination protection’s
group based rationale creates more problems than it solves. Y oshino’s thesis in
particular, published when Windsor was under exam,  is openly strategic, or
instrumental.  Traditional Equal Protection leaves poor room to gay rights. For
these latter to have some success, the former needs reframing[4]. Y et Y oshino
pays careful attention to demonstrate that what goes in the interest of gay
rights -  which is to say: the abandonment or reduction of traditional group
based anti-discriminatory protection - goes also in the interest of other
minorities, as Latinos. Their aspiration to using Spanish, when examined in
light of old Equal Protection, would put on the foreground the awkward
‘identity’ components of Latinos claims, stepping the resentment up. Instead,
framing the issue in the universal terms of a right of all to speak their language
would grant it much more success. Nonetheless, in  Y oshino’s reasoning works
the liberal belief, according to which in every society there is a fixed amount of
rights and freedoms, or, in other words, of resources for recognition. Thereby, if
the interests of some prevail, the amount of recognition accorded to the
interests of others, in this case those of traditional ethnic or religious minorities,
has to be reduced or modified. To the same liberal premises arguably belong
Y oshino’s efforts to demonstrate that the New Equal Protection would create
empathy, cohesion and would fight against a dangerous process of status
fragmentation, which traditional anti-discrimination fosters. Shifting anti-
discrimination to dignity, is, in other words, what the  ‘Common Good’ today
requires.
 
2. The European Scenery. A) The European Union. A second group of opinions,
which have not yet been fully theorized, suggest that  dignity could offer a new
rationale for anti-discrimination protection with a different outlook. It is an
orientation which finds its roots in current paths of anti-discrimination in
Europe. Therefore, firstly I will  provide a quick description of these. .
In Europe, there are two main sources of anti-discrimination protection, the
European Union Law, and the European Convention of Human Rights. The
first is under the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), whereas
the second is under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR). In fact, anti-discriminatory protection is in Europe the distinctive
product of supranational integration, while national constitutions and legal
traditions were, and still are, more attached to the principle of equality[5].
Over the years, the European Union has produced an extended body of anti-
discriminatory law, which openly finds its inspirational source in the  Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act[6]. Protected grounds are now gender, age, disability,
ethnic and national origins, sexual orientation and personal opinions and
beliefs. Parity in pay and working conditions is the core content of EU anti-
discrimination law. In the 2000s there has been a general increase of its
contents, notably towards housing, education, access to services (such as
insurances service, for women). An ‘economic aim’ has always characterized
the EU’s approach to anti-discrimination. Originally, the EU was preoccupied
of disparity in men and women’s wages, seen as a potential distortion of fair
competition within the common market in that it caused different costs of
labor. The EU has constantly considered a non-discriminatory access to the job
market a cure, and actually the main one, to social problems as exclusion and
vulnerability; thereby, to some, the very aim of EU anti-discrimination law is
pursuing and fostering occupational levels, together with an open inclination to
picturing the market as a positive and socially inclusive player[7]. Anti-
discrimination is thus in the EU the main content of social policies, and the
instrument through which the CJEU syndicates the compliance of national
laws with the objectives of the Treaties. 
A rigidly, formalistic comparative approach, to some extent biased or one-sided,
have been the distinctive characters of the pro-market biased CJEU’s anti-
discriminatory case law, which sometimes shows an impressive lack of
reciprocity. This is a striking symptom that the anti-discrimination protection
can somewhat contradict equality (as imperative to an equal consideration of
contrasting interests). When understood, as it happens in the EU, as a mean to
reach socially desirable ends, the anti-discriminatory judgment necessarily
favors those interests, or those interpretations, or those arguments, that go
towards the preferred goal. Thus, according to the CJEU,  anti-discrimination
dictates dismantling protective legislation, which disfavor women by
stereotyping their role. If people do not understand that some rights they enjoy
(like an early retirement age for women) are instead discriminatory stereotypes,
there is the Commission that appeals against the national legislation in their
interest; and the Court proudly stresses that it does not care whether the
legislation responds to some political, social, cultural evaluation which can be
important at the national level[8]. Its strength notwithstanding, anti-
discrimination does not dictate anything to entrepreneurs. For instance, in a
famous case, a male employee  (whose wife worked in a company which had
no nursery), was denied to benefit the service from his company. The Court
responded that one cannot charge the employer (who for business reasons had
reserved the nursery to female employees’ children) with his family problems
(Lommers, C-479/99). One of the Court’s leading principles, “As parents men
and women are equal” (Commission vs France, C-212/1988), works against
protective legislation, not against private business[9].
Such asymmetrical approaches are not extraneous to the scholarly aspiration,
which dates since long, for dignity being understood as the good that anti-
discrimination protects. Those who think so, want to say that it is the human
person, not the performances of EU markets, the objective of EU anti-
discrimination protection; they also want to overcome a firmly comparative
based reasoning which prevents the CJEU from addressing multiple and inter-
sectional discrimination[10]. Y et, these aspirations to dignity often are a
demand for more social justice. What they basically express, however, is the
need that judging on discrimination means taking into equal consideration
different points of views, interests and values.
 
3. B) The European Court of Human Rights. Another source of anti-
discrimination protection is the European Court of Human Rights. Even
though they are assisted by a ‘persuasive’ strength only, it decisions are
enormously influential. The ECH has followed an evolving and dialectical
approach to its task, which is that of ascertaining whether a state action
violates one of the rights recognized by the ECHR. To assess whether a state
action complies or not with what is required by a ‘democratic society’ the Court
takes carefully  into account the state’s legal order and traditions, as well as its
social and cultural characters,  the motive of its action, the circumstances of the
case, and how the matter is treated in the other countries. If a ‘general
consensus’ about the theme at stake can be ascertained, diverging actions are
suspicious; but the more the issues are complex and delicate, the more
differences are allowed and tolerated, until a ‘consensus’ is established (the
Court recognizes, in other words, a state’s ‘margin of appreciation’). The Court
itself is a player of such an evolving consensus: even when it does not condemn 
a state, its arguments can reinforce certain values and interests, influence
future national judicial paths, etc.
The ECHR can determine that someone suffered from a discrimination in the
enjoyment of the rights recognized by the Convention. Thereby this Court
examines the prohibition of discrimination as a problem of equal enjoyment of
fundamental rights, instead of considering it a problem of correct application of
some specific anti-discriminatory legislation, as it is in the case of the CJEU.
The connection between the prohibition of discrimination and the enjoyment of
a fundamental right has conferred a certain degree of flexibility to the ECHR’s
case law. The Court poses itself two questions. Firstly, has this individual
suffered from a violation of a fundamental right? Secondly, was this a
discrimination? It can reply affirmatively to either question, or only to the first.
There are many cases in which this Court declares that a fundamental right has
been violated, without going further, without saying that there was also a
discrimination. Even though it sometimes raises disappointment[11], this way
of reasoning arguably allows the Court to  foster a value (the value, for
example, of gay partnerships, as expression of the right to family life)[12]
without affirming it does not bear different degrees of realization, or without
superimposing the Court’s point of view on that of national authorities and
public opinion[13]. 
Being linked to the enjoyment of fundamental rights, the prohibition of
discrimination can be activated by everyone in relation to every right
recognized by the Convention. There is no matter of ‘protected groups’ before
the ECHR, which does not speak, consequently, of suspect classes or tiered
scrutiny. However, scholars say that something similar happens in the ECHR’s
case-law with referral to women and religious groups. In those cases, the Court
asks for ‘very weighty reasons’ in order to find a difference in treatment
legitimate. This is, however, a consequence of the comparative and dialectic
method followed by the Court: religious freedom is a distinctive character of
modern states, and the same goes for gender issues (largely as a consequences
of the EU’s action). Longstanding and largely diffused concrete practices and
ideal aspirations to religious freedom and gender equality do authorize the
Court to speak of them as  indubitable components of a ‘democratic society’.
The prohibition of discrimination can also operate as a control of inner
rationality, or of non-contradiction, within a single national legal order. If, for
instance, one state gives homosexual couples some recognition, like ‘civil
partnerships’, differences of treatment between these latter and marriage are
more severely syndicated by the Court in the name of non-discrimination[14].
In the ECHR’s reasoning, dignity is often present. This word has rich, various,
complex correspondences within the national legal orders, where it assumes
different meanings and roles[15]. Thereby, in the ECHR’s reasoning, dignity is a
functional component of an argumentation which is ‘dialectical’, in the sense
that it proceeds without assuming that rights and freedoms, that are protected
by the Court, have an ‘a priori’ meaning, as  if it were an external abstract and
fixed list of ready-made ‘European values’ that states are forced to recognize.
Instead,  the Court proceeds by weighing and comparing different point of
views, experiences and practices. In this frame, dignity seems to be working as
a dialogical and relational concept, which takes differences of cultures,
experiences, paths, into account[16]. As matter of fact, in the rare cases in
which the CJEU in its turn also makes use of the word ‘dignity’ it is to recognize
national specificities[17]. 
 
4. The second component of the ‘universal and dignitarian turn’. Improving
the quality of the non-discrimination principle as an instrument of legal
evaluation. The European Court of Human Rights’ demonstrates that
references to dignity, a shared value which has nonetheless different meanings
amongst the different states, favor a more ductile, evaluative and dialogical
approach to  the problems that anti-discrimination implies (what is to be
compared with what, what is worth and what is not, or less worth, and why).
Criticism against the CJEU, and interest towards the ECHR’s case law, create
in Europe a wide, even if neither internal homogeneous nor fully theorized
wave of opinions, that look  to dignity as ‘rationale’ of the anti-discrimination
prohibition with the aim of improving its accuracy, depth and richness.
This set of ideas is echoed by some components of the north American debate.
Some years ago, writing on abortion, Reva Siegel recognized that dignity could
legitimize ‘competing claims’ towards sensitive issues[18]. Dignity is here
perceived as an evaluative instrument that allows deeper investigation whether
a certain act is discriminating towards someone. Does this act respond or not, to
valuable interests of others? By favoring contrasting views to be formulated and
confronted, dignity does reinforce equality amongst claims and improves the
controversial texture of the discussion. Likewise, examining the Canadian
Supreme Court case law, D. Réaume, in an essay which has largely circulated
also in Europe, envisaged in dignity the possible precondition for an
improvement of anti-discriminatory decisions, as vehicle of a judicial dialectics
about the meaning and value of different human actions and conditions[19].
In these opinions, dignity is put in relation with the anti-discriminatory pattern
and considered an interesting yardstick capable of enlarging and deepening the
knowledge of a controversial issue. Similarly to the previously mentioned, that
are worried about inconvenient social side-effects of anti-discrimination, also
these opinions  invoke dignity to solve problems and limits of anti-
discrimination law. Instead of the efficiency, here is the quality of the anti-
discrimination prohibition as an instrument of legal evaluation which is focused
on. Due to its scarceness, dignity is regarded as an useful tool for its
improvement.
 
5. Stepping backwards: the utilitarian matrix of anti-discrimination law in
question. The universal and dignitarian turn of anti-discrimination law is thus
twofold: on the one side there are those who question it for its allegedly high
social costs; on the other side those who advocate against it questioning its
‘legal’ costs, which produce formalism and stillness.
What side of the debate does really put into  question ‘traditional’ or ‘old’ anti-
discrimination protection? To which limits and fallacies of it does the
dignitarian turn aim to respond? These questions force us to step back to the
origins of anti-discrimination law, to its constitutive features.
These features are those of one of the most remarkable implementation of
utilitarian conceptions of law. The anti-discriminatory protection is an
expression of legal realism, and thereby of instrumentalism, which conceives
law as a social technique useful to achieve ends, to realize the common good. 
The instrumental component of anti-discrimination law is clearly visible in the
EU experience, where, as I have mentioned before, anti-discrimination law was
born (and has being living) with an open utilitarian purpose.  A strong realistic,
and in this sense utilitarian, matrix, is recognizable in the American experience
of anti-discrimination law. Brown vs Board of Education showed that a Court
can change the world if only it adapts law to the times, relies on expert proof
and deserts the old instruments of legal reasoning. The Civil Rights Act’s intense
social and progressive impetus is paradigmatic to realistic aspirations to use
private law as a tool to reach public law ends. With these two archetypes at its
basis, anti-discrimination law is quintessential to an instrumental conception of
law, which was the soul of American legal realism and  is shared by many
progressive and reformist opinions.
In order to understand the implications of the shift of anti-discrimination
towards dignity, it is crucial to focus on what utilitarianism means in law.
Strengthening the utilitarian paradigm that seizes anti-discrimination or losing
it is the core issue which is at the basis of the universal and dignitarian turn.
This is,  in other words, a cultural turn. At stake there are different conceptions
of law and of its social function, which influence the way in which the typical
problems of anti-discrimination (who and what does deserve protection, and
why?) are reasoned.
In the end, what, then, utilitarianism does mean?  It is often said that
utilitarianism implies a diminished vision of the human person and of her
rights[20], but it would be wrong to establish such a bi-univocal
correspondence. Pursuing ends does not mean pursuing evil ends. The utility,
which instrumental visions trust the law to pursue, resembles a superior law,
which limits the existing law conditioning its validity, but it is not necessarily
the utility of the powerful or of the most influential. As a matter of fact,
instrumental visions can as well consist in a dispute of existing law and habits
in the name of superior exigencies of justice, which want to protect, exactly, a
higher image of the human being and of her/his social needs. After all, Brown
seemed to offer support to Martin Luther King’s civil rights movement ideals of
natural justice or righteousness[21]. 
The coexistence between utilitarian calculation and ideal aspirations to justice is
a fascinating feature of American realism[22]. This, in its turn, was a
ponderous manifestation of realistic and sociological trends that, in the first half
of the 1900s, went through the European legal culture, not rarely in association
with progressive, ‘democratic’ views. Thus, it is not the lack of ideals that marks
utilitarian and instrumental conceptions of law: their mark, instead, is
skepticism towards the autonomy of law as a form of knowledge and as an
experience. In that sense, utilitarianism devalues law, whose methods of
reasoning, as the recourse to analogy and to general principles, are considered
fallacies that on the one hand allow judges to take political decisions while
hiding their subjectivism behind a false neutrality[23], and that, on the other
hand,  threaten  the efficient achievement of the pursued goals.  But
utilitarianism also values law, as a means to secure the goals it pursues.
In an instrumental view, it is therefore of the utmost importance that guidance
from the external is given to law, from politics, or from  social sciences, from
legal theory, because, if left to its own ways of functioning law won’t evolve, or
won’t evolve quickly enough, or won’t evolve in the right –opportune –
directions. When law’s inner capability of autonomous evolution is denied, law
remains as a technique useful to pursuing aims. That these aims are socially
useful, politically opportune, morally just aims, I repeat, it makes little
difference. What instrumental views have in common is to exclude that law is
in itself an ideal, a moral good thanks to its specific ways of functioning.
Instrumental conceptions think that law is only a means to distribute and re-
distribute power in society; and thereby, that power rules law.
Over centuries, during the history of law, instrumental visions have been
contrasting conceptions that, instead, consider law a value in itself. This is a
dynamic which has nothing to do with  the distinction between positivism and
jus-naturalism (it actually crosses it). Certainly, however, voluntarism and
rationalism (to which utilitarianism belongs) oppose to conceptions according
to which law is an expression of the sociability of the human being, in that
sense of his ‘nature’.  Thus, I am saying, the raise of anti-discrimination law is
one of the moment in the history of law when instrumental conceptions of law
prevail on the idea that law is a value in itself. What exactly happens when this
occurs? Is something lost? 
This is an intriguing question, the answer to which, of course, mostly depends
on what is regarded as ‘law as a value  itself’. Important studies that have
reflected on this[24] suggest that the idea that law is a value   itself corresponds
to the ‘Classical Natural Law Thought’ (Aristotelian, Roman and Thomistic).
This is  premised on the idea of a natural changeable ‘just’ (Villey), and is
expression of a controversial, dialectical and evolutive conception of law, where
no a-priori truth is established, because problems that law faces, as human
facts, are seen as a matter of opinion, arguable and debatable[25].  Here, those
who look for justice – the judges, the parties, and the legislator too - are bound
to tell the truth, what is true to them; they can ask for justice, to what is to
them just. Classical Natural Law is premised on an ideal of equilibrium between
legislator and judge, regarded as if they were in a “perennial dialogue”
(Giuliani). The work of both composes Law and is bound to the same
principles, which is  exactly what allows the judge to correct or mitigate laws
when their concrete outcomes are unjust. The idea that existing laws are
contestable in the name of a superior justice (or ‘utility’) is thereby extraneous
to these views. Basic to them, is instead the autonomy of law towards politics
and other social sciences, being law driven by its own form of reason, one
which acknowledges the limited possibilities of human knowledge. This stresses
that law is a ‘social enterprise’, which needs cooperation amongst many minds. 
Inter-subjectivity, not the solitary will of a Wise or of a Mighty Man (or of
many wise or mighty men all sharing the same idea of what is wise, the same
idea of what counts) is what makes law. The values, that law grants, are first of
all those of the procedure[26]; which is speaking fairly, listening carefully to
others’ objections, paying strong attention to the circumstances of the case
(time and space included).
Utilitarian views of laws and views according to which law is a per se value do
recur in the history of law, both at a theoretical level and an institutional one.
They are framed within different forms of reasons. They vehicle different ideas
of social order.
For the utilitarian,  the values, that law is able to pursue are those with which a
good governor imbues it, and the community has to be driven towards desirable
ends selected in the name of their utility. Utilitarianism goes together with
rationalism and voluntarism, and  reflects an asymmetric view of the
community.
‘Law as a per se value’, which prizes inter-subjectivity and fairness reflects
instead an ‘isonomic order’ within the community and amongst the
communities[27].
It is the form of reason that accompanies the idea of law as a “Law as a per se
value” which I want to stress.  If there is no external truth to be acknowledged,
and sophistry is banned,  law searches justice and truth acknowledging  that
human beings are limited, and so is their capability of reaching knowledge of
truth and justice. Vico’s concept of ‘veriloquium’ describes this ideal[28]. It is
the ideal of a rationality conscious of its limits, and ethically engaged.
The ideal that moves this conception of law is the ‘suum cuique’ (‘give each his
own’).  This classical principle that establishes the link between justice and
equality is understood, here, as a mobilizing, progressive, ideal. As M. Villey
once put it: “searching unceasingly the right part to be owed to everybody and
not protecting rights subtracted to discussion, this is the jurors task, and this is
not to be confused with moral”. Considering law as a per se value is sometimes
accused of being conservative. But what causes trouble with these visions is the
challenge they bring to any reduction of the human experience to a plan.
Actually one doesn’t know where exactly the quest for justice brings us; this is
the reason for rationalism of all sort, strongly interested in that ‘results’ are got,
devalue dialectical, topical and equitable components of law[29].
The idea of law as a good ‘per se’ stresses isonomy (the equality between those
who govern and those who are governed) and the sociability of human reason.
Being convinced that no absolute truth can be achieved in human things, law
recognizes that each human being is competent in matters of good and just,
and that we need each other to proceed in these matters. Demanding respect for
a rigorous argumentation, which focuses on what is relevant, excludes what is
irrelevant, combats abuses and sophistries, demands proofs, it is civilizing. It is
confident that the ‘exchange of truth in truth’ (Vico) is  the way through which
conflicts can be dealt with. It is evolutive, because preexisting rules are
confronted to new needs, feelings and experiences. It pays great importance,
nonetheless, to the history and the past, to things as they are, necessary
benchmarks in order to assess the value, worth, meaning of new issues. The
past, after all, creates the ordinary language, which is the language through
which we understand each other; and law does speak in the ordinary language.
When a ‘law as a per se value’ conception gives room to utilitarian visions of
law all of these things tend to fade, to give way, because they are mistrusted.
The paths of anti-discrimination law are a good evidence of this.
 
6. Anti-caste principle vs equitableness. Anti-discrimination as triumphant
skepticism towards law.  Today many studies denounce the instrumentalism of
anti-discrimination law. They find that anti-discrimination, used to deal with
conflicts within the society,  has often worked  strategically by selecting  themes
that at a given moment appeared urgent, and by reshaping them in ways,
compatible with the status quo. According to Goluboff, anti-discrimination
protection worked, in the Us, by transforming the social and economic issue of
inequality suffered by Afroamericans, into a problem of stigma, status and
moral harm[30]. As for the EU, A. Somek dramatically argues that EU anti-
discrimination law is essentially the instrument through which European
societies are being reshaped on market needs[31]. Dissenting with  the goals
toward which antidiscrimination law is driven does not necessarily mean,
however, putting instrumental conceptions of law into discussion. Most of the
debate about anti-discrimination law is internal to instrumental premises.
Scholars have opposed views regarding the goals to be reached, but they do not
question that anti-discrimination law serves to reach ends, as that this is, in
general, what law does. 
The typical dispute among ends that has always accompanied anti-
discrimination law is not the only consequence of its constitutive utilitarian
matrix. Instrumental and skeptical views are clearly mirrored in all the most
typical narratives that come together with anti-discrimination law. Let’s recall
some.
According to its European apologists, the anti-discrimination prohibition is far
better than the old, broad, ‘purely rational’ Aristotelian formula, which gives
content to the principle of equality: to treat the like alike, the different
differently[32], which is another version of the ‘to each his own’ principle. It is
easy to point the finger at this formula: it doesn’t say what is equal and what is
not; it brings the risk of excessive judicial discretion, which can only result in
the opposite faults of activism or deference. It does not grant certain and
predictable results. 
Contemporary extended, routinely criticism towards the Aristotelian formula
stems from a ‘realistic’ vision of law. This forgets, or denies, what the
Aristotelian formula presumes. Problems that a jurist deals with pertain to the
reign of opinions, they are debatable and questionable and require a form of
reason suited for them[33], one that never presumes that, somewhere, the
‘right’, definitive and only solution for a given problem is to be found (in
statutes, in social science, in economics…)[34]. It is easy to understand why
anti-discrimination ideals are at odds with the equitable performances of the
Aristotelian formula. This latter allows laws to be corrected, mitigated, slowly
modified. Which, understandably, can appear really too little for un-justices to
be remedied.
Likewise, the concepts, of which anti-discrimination law and theories make use,
brim over with skepticism towards law. Those concepts stem from a
sociological matrix, and are by nature enemies to traditional instruments of
legal evaluation. ‘Gender’, for instance, is a social construction or – in the
postmodern uses of the concept – a vest that queer identities can put on and off
at their liking. If societies, history, habits do create stereotypes, they can’t be
taken as benchmarks to evaluate what is like, alike, or different; which is what
the Aristotelian formula (and the ideal of law as a per se value) requires to do.
Social habits, common sense, shared ideas of what is just and existing laws are
what anti-discrimination wants to reform: how can they work as a valuable
help in judicial reasoning? After all: do we need to ascertain what is valuable
and what is not? Some say that law should refrain from judging in the merit of
ways of life, behaviors or beliefs, and should limit to ascertain the ‘equivalence’
amongst differences[35]. In the ideal scenery of a fully accomplished anti-
discriminatory society, there would not be space left for judging. Judging would
become useless.
Theories that study, criticize and discuss anti-discrimination are carved within
an instrumental vision of law. Y et anti-discrimination law has been largely
criticized for its implicit logic of sameness; nonetheless, the anti-subordination
theory, that fights against sameness, assigns to anti-discrimination law the task
of attacking the existing power relationships. Law, which is useless as a form of
reasoning and judging, is priceless as a means of coercion.  Which is what law
is reduced to, when thought in purely instrumental terms.
These are terms, that perennially renew the political ideal of equality as an anti-
caste principle[36], and its fight against equitableness. It is the fight of a form
of reason against one other. One, that praises reasonableness and moderation
as the valuable and inescapable companions of the sociability of human being.
The other, that praises predictability, and is calculating, goal-oriented, strategic
and pessimistic; presumes that reality needs to be ordered within a plan. It is
asymmetric and mono-logical, because presumes that someone can dictate to
others the right direction to follow.
One should never forget that the anti-caste principle, besides fascinating those
who are marginalized and excluded, has always worked as  a priceless
instrument of governmental power[37]. 
 
7. Turning to dignity in the name of efficiency. I  commenced by saying that
the universal and dignitarian turn has two components: some theses foster
dignity as new rationale of anti-discrimination law in order to achieve some
efficiency goals. Their aim is avoiding negative social side effects which
allegedly anti-discrimination provokes, and granting success to anti-
discriminatory claims of new kind, such as those of gay people. These are ‘pro-
efficiency’ theses. Other theses praise dignity as a  way to a more ductile,
evolutive, depth and dialectical approach to problems of the living together.
These are  ‘pro-quality’ theses. In these two components of the ‘universal
dignitarian turn’ we recognize the two eternal components of legal experience,
the two sides of equality, equality as anti-caste principle, that want society to be
reformed, equality as equitableness, which wants society to shape itself.
My conclusions, I think, are easy to guess: I maintain that the first group of
theses, that turns to dignity in the name of efficiency, rests largely within the
frame in which anti-discrimination law is carved, that is within an
instrumental conception of law. Which is what, even if not openly, the second
group of opinions starts putting into discussion. 
In order to show the relations between the pro-efficiency components of the
universalistic and dignitarian turn and traditional, instrumental components of
anti-discrimination law I’ll turn back to the brilliant, challenging and inspiring
thesis of K. Y oshino. Y et this is not a difficult task: instrumentality, in Y oshino’s
thesis, certainly is not disguised. For that reason however his thesis offers the
opportunity to highlight the ways of reasoning to which utilitarianism is
associated to, which is what I am interested in doing.
Y oshino’s essay starts with a  diagnosis of ongoing social problems (status
fragmentation) then it says what law has to do in order to solve those 
problems. The realist understanding of the jurist as a sort of social expert who
weighs social interests and looks at them (more, allegedly, than at the good
reasons of the parties, or to precedents, and so on) when dealing with a
controversial issue, is here at work. Law has to show adaptability to social
change. Its performances, besides,  are measured on their predictability and
uniformity; since Courts can’t offer ‘mathematical demonstrations’, Y oshino
writes, their decisions can’t be but unprincipled, and thereby useless, if not
counterproductive at all. Y et, it is a sign of our times that politics is no longer
considered by Y oshino able to offer guidance to law. This  reinforces the need
for well-constructed,  self-containing theories. Reality is regarded as highly
irrational, so are people, their needs, their will and the institutions they give life
to. Pessimism in the human nature goes together with skepticism towards law,
stressing the exigency that a vision is developed, a plan designed, which orders
what is by nature incapable of producing order.
 
8. Beyond the commutative rationale of anti-discrimination protection. Saying
that Y oshino’s universal turn is framed in the same instrumental, skeptical
frame of old anti-discrimination law, I do not mean to undervalue differences
between ‘the new equality protection’ and the older one. The most blatant
among these are two. Firstly, the dignitarian turn aims to abandon the original
commutative rationale of anti-discrimination protection, which was meant to
be a compensation for harms that a group has suffered in the past. Secondly,
the New Equal Protection doesn’t aim to redistribute goods, but honors. Here
we perceive the fundamental role played by dignity: this word sums up the
honors that society pays to what it considers valuable. Sharing the same honors
is the up-dated goal of anti-discrimination protection.  
I  hold the view that these two aspects of Y oshino’s thesis are the latest offspring
of the very skeptical core of realism. 
The commutative rationale of anti-discrimination lies, at the very end, on a key
figure of the juridical, that of wrong[38]. Commutation is nothing but a form
of justice. If someone has suffered a tort, an abuse, a damage, he has to be paid
some compensation; precisely, he has to be paid the right, or the fair,
compensation. The commutative rationale connects the social technique that
we call anti-discrimination, to the very basic, typical, essential tasks of law, that
of looking for the just compensation of wrongs. Admittedly, this connection is
scarcely operative and even less visible. Anti-discrimination looks much more
like an attempt of pre-formatting and making uniform the notion both of the
harm that someone has suffered and of the just compensation (slavery made
you poor; sexism secluded you at home; I’ll try to help you enter the job
market), than an effort of keeping on discussing about the tort someone
suffered, the meaning he attaches to it, the idea he has of what a just
compensation would be. Such an effort would require investigating what past
harms mean today, how they are felt, what would be the just compensation,
constantly keeping in mind that new harms can happen and touch new
subjects. Instead, real anti-discrimination, the machinery that we know,
proceeds by administering today the answers that were imagined yesterday[39].
It is stuck in the alternative between extending to new and diverse demands the
same old answers, or not replying at all.   Why has anti-discrimination become
void and bureaucratic? I guess it is because it is no longer fueled by the sincere
effort to understand, recognize, evaluate the wrong in topical, circumstantiated
ways. Its commutative rationale has given room to a bureaucratic one. When
we accuse the anti-discrimination protection of being formalistic, conservative,
mute[40], we register that the mobilizing flame of the ‘suum cuique’ has
extinguished.
The utilitarian matrix of anti-discrimination law has always coexisted badly
with its commutative rationale, which inscribes a purely juridical element
within anti-discrimination law. Rigidity and stillness of anti-discrimination
protection are the result. Nonetheless, the commutative rationale is  the only
thing which reminds us that the social and political machinery of anti-
discrimination stems from a basic research for justice. If newest steps of realism
openly claim that the commutative rationale has to be abandoned, what does it
imply? The abandonment of the commutative rationale is realistic unease
towards the specific law’s task at its peak. For it is clear, what’s the matter
indeed with commutative justice? It drags us in the world of the debatable, of
the questionable, of the variety, plurality, diversity of interests. Instrumentalism
thinks that there is no point in dealing with this. Interests are too many, diverse
and changeable: lingering on weighing and comparing them is not practical.  If
we do not trust in law as a form of reason apt to deal with such things – and
realism doesn’t -  we can’t recognize that it is through them that justice makes
its path. 
In other words, by abandoning the commutative rationale of anti-
discrimination protection the New Equality brings the instrumental matrix of it
one step forward. Further weakening the judicial components of anti-
discrimination means enhancing the political ones. The result is not new. It is
in an abstract model of democracy that the solution of controversies has to be
found. Y oshino reasons that since democracies suffer from excesses of
pluralism, the anti-discrimination protection has to be reduced. Qualitative
problems become quantitative problems and anti-discrimination is, realistically,
understood as a variable of the political system, not as a field of juridical
enquire. The political dimension of redistributive justice comes on the
foreground, and it is, as I said, distribution of the honors which is now stressed.
In new clothes, this is the stamp of old anti-discrimination that surfaces.
Distributing dignity, instead of goods, changes little in a path of anti-
discrimination which has already been read as a story, where problems
originating from an un-just distribution of goods, have been translated into a
question of status and social image. For this reasons, it keeps anti-
discrimination firmly tied to its constitutive impossibility to change the status
quo.
 
9. Towards the ‘justice of the honors’. In the pro-efficiency versions of the
universal turn, making of ‘dignity’ the new rationale of Equal protection means
putting the accent on redistributive components only, and shifting
redistribution towards honors. This, I  have been saying, does not change
anything in the instrumental matrix of anti-discrimination law. It confirms
and deepens it, while leaving unaddressed the very problem that anti-
discrimination law has always raised. What is this problem? Martha L.
Fineman states it clearly: anti-discrimination does not change the values that a
community praises. Apparently, the presence in a society of an anti-
discrimination protection works for solidarity, empathy, fraternity to be spread;
but, Fineman says, a long history of anti-discrimination has left the American
society more egoistic and selfish than ever[41].
From my European point of view, I can testimony of another, huge failure of
anti-discrimination protection, which in Europe we discuss largely enough.
Women have massively entered the market place, with the aid of massive anti-
discriminatory norms. Has this changed anything regarding the quality of jobs?
Has the pivotal role of money&career on human lives been put in discussion?
Job quality, as a matter of fact, has dramatically fell down. Many speak of
‘feminization’ of work in order to mean that workers  have been reduced to play
the female role, that of passive victims.
Why anti-discrimination does so, why it reinforces the existing values (or dis-
values) as if it were captured by the status quo and then governed by it in the
only interests of its preservation and fostering?
Reasons are surely many, but one, I would say, remounts to the instrumental
logic that antidiscrimination law and theories do share. Strategic thinking is
driven by the logic of consensus; and, as H. Wechsler has taught, for an issue to
be successful it must be formulated in the most general terms. The divisive
components of an issue have then to be avoided, in that they create conflict and
discussion which – allegedly – weaken consensus, which is key to victory. The
technique of reaching the highest degree of generalization is subordinated, or
subaltern, to one implicit deal. Demands for recognition can aspire to be
accepted only if they are tolerable to the existing order. By definition, the theory
of consensus is based on the idea that in society implicitly exists an agreement
around some fundamental values. These are the platform for recognition, but
also the perimeter of it. Claims built on the consensus-generative technique of
the highest generalization possible (which is also the technique of the highest
possible abstraction from concrete contexts of life, interest and experience)
must be shaped as if they were coincidental with values and ideals already
known, recognized, protected. Rather inevitably they end up by confirming
these latter.
This can explain why a brand new message as ‘marriage for all’ does not fail to
be addressed by the same criticism associated to traditional anti-discriminatory
proposals: it ‘homologates’ by reinforcing the hegemony of marriage, or by
discriminating against bisexuals, intersexual or a-sexual people[42]. 
Represented in new clothes, the instrumental matrix of anti-discrimination
makes itself recognizable from the problems it ignores and  leaves unsolved.
It has been said, after all, that the search for the Useful is since ever the enemy
of the search for Truth.
 
10. Turning to dignity in another way: dignity as a quest for more (e)quality
in anti-discrimination reasoning. Those which I have described the ‘pro-quality’
orientations to dignity neither  give the impression of invoking dignity in order
to remove the spiny aspects of anti-discrimination issues (why this group
deserves protection, and this does not? Why this conduct is discriminatory, and
this is not?). Nor they seem to be wanting to deny a component of traditional
anti-discrimination, which is its referral to groups and minorities, on the basis
that it can be troublesome for the success of some claims. In these cases, the
call for dignity sounds much more like the aspiration to widening and
deepening the controversial dimension of issues that the jurist faces. It is an
appeal to the performances of a form of reason capable of dealing with the
debatable and the controversial.
Arguably, these opinions do not ask anti-discrimination law to keep doing what
it has always been expected to do – redistributing quotes of social power – but
to rediscover the specific, challenging task of law, which is searching the just,
on the terrain of opinions and in the topical consideration of the determined
contexts (normative, institutional, cultural) where each single issue is posed
and discussed. This corresponds to the growing attention to how discussing
about the just, which is the specific function of law, is a value[43], because it
increases the cohesion within society allowing communities to go through their
conflicts.
When dignity is invoked as a premise to legitimize ‘competing claims’ or to
deepen the knowledge of an issue in its qualitative aspects, like it happens in the
positions of Siegel of Réame which I mentioned at the beginning of this work,
dignity conveys the virtues, transformative and socially constructive, of the
‘suum cuique’. Dignity is a way to re-establish the nexus between equality and
justice, that the mechanical operations of the anti-discriminatory paradigm, the
old and the new one, tend to avoid, or to deny. In these cases there is a possible
deviation from the idea - kept unmodified by the pro-efficiency theses -  that
conflicts are by nature destructive and thereby must be shaped in formulations
that refuse their divisive potential, which is considered their only possible, and
dangerous, result.  There is also the appeal to the resources of a form of reason
sufficiently ductile to imagine that recognizing rights, aspirations, needs and
values of someone does not necessarily mean to sacrifice those of another.
Capable, in other words, to emancipate law from a calculation that must
always equal zero[44].
Theses that aspire to dignity as a way to improve the anti-discrimination
evaluation  call for more equitableness and reasonableness in law. Y et there is
always the risk that it is all about magnifying the virtues of dialogue, or
depicting the eternal, deceptive hymn to the virtues of tolerance. For that
reason, interesting and valuable are the efforts of some scholars, who,
investigating the flow of dignity in the reasoning of the European Court of
Human Rights, carefully try to interpret it as a principle of law that interacts
with the discrimination protection and allows it to enter into a dialectics with
the national legal traditions[45]. In those cases there is awareness that results
and future directions of the anti-discrimination principle mostly depend on the
capability of jurors of considering it as a principle of law, instead of an
adjustable tool which can be bent according to convenience in the fight of
variable interests for prevail. Such an approach requires accurate analyses of
single controversies; careful, topical and circumstantiated consideration of the
issue at stake, of the relevance of arguments that are brought, of the
consistency of wrongs lamented.  This is the way that brings to a real renewal
with traditional anti-discrimination’s rationale. It is no longer about tiredly
remedying to un-justices of the past of which nobody wants to discuss. Neither
it is about, as it is suggested by the pro-efficiency side of the universal and
dignitarian turn,  granting to everyone those liberties that are allegedly inherent
to human nature, which no one is supposed to discuss. In a controversial,
dialectical vision of law, the rationale of anti-discrimination becomes trying to
find the fair (congruous, apt, adequate, just) treatment of a given situation by
taking into account, in each single case, what subjectivities are involved, what
requests they make, how these requests fit in the legal context they are posed.
By taking into account that there can be, however, abuses of redress, which are
giving too much, giving too little, and giving something that is irrelevant. By
this way, conditions are re-established to make anti-discrimination protection a
terrain where different interests and visions contrast each other without a plan,
a direction that orientates them, without an order to be respected. Law is given
back, in that way, and potentially, its autonomy: it is no longer charged with
shoring up that certain idea of democracy, of social order, of the Just and the
Useful, with which from time to time the anti-discrimination justifies itself, but
offers a terrain for an impartial confrontation  amongst interests and values.
From this the re-discussion, revision, thus change can come, of the values of
the living together.
When dignity means a shift towards a more controversial, dialectical approach
to law it restores isonomy; and this, really changes something in the anti-
discrimination rationale. In a utilitarian view, minorities are seen as problems.
They are too many, too demanding, too resilient to a planning activity. Or they
are seen as bearers of interests competing each other to win recognition. They
can be seen, instead,  as active parts of one discussion which is supposed to
change, gradually, the world we have in common. Actually, if there is isonomy 
no one is in ‘minority’, and everybody is party, and ‘partial’. Each one is
supposed to have a feeling of what is just, what is good. 
Apparently rooted in pre-modern schemes, a controversial, dialectical, equitable
conception of law might be the one, better able to conceptualize the real, great
transformation that has happened in Western societies after sixty years of
democracy. Minorities (women, people of color, precarious workers, LGTB) do
not think of themselves as minorities, but as the bearers of new ‘universal’, of
different conceptions of the living together. They consider themselves to be fully
legitimate to concur in shaping our common world. What’s wrong with anti-
discrimination law is that it pictures society as a large majoritarian body
surrounded by many smaller bodies that maybe have to be helped, or awarded,
or recognized, but are expected to remain insignificant. This does no longer
correspond to a society where minorities are actually the 99%: here, anti-
discrimination law’s modern ideology of social engineering is discovered to be
marked by a time-worn patriarchal attitude, which refuses to take account of
the “freedom and capacity of citizens – men and women alike – to shape the
world through full-scale negotiation of their respective positions, as well as their
duties and desires”[46]. This kind of visions expresses the need for the ‘suum
cuique’ principle to operate its transformative and mobilizing effects amongst
us. They clearly show what is making antidiscrimination behind the times. Its
utilitarian, paternalistic implications are today invited to give room to a deeper
understanding of equality.
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established with certainty; doing so  is to commit an error that obscures the
contextual nature of practical reasoning.
[34] That judges, if not driven by strong legislative choices, would not be able to
deal with equality issues, or would do it only in a conservative way is a
traditional firm conviction of progressive American scholarship and it is firmly
maintained by  J. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in
Workplace Protections, in Indiana Law Journal, 2011, p. 1219 ss. Less
pessimism is showed by others. A. Bloom, Blindsight: How We See Disability in
Tort Litigation, in Washington Law Rev., 4/2011, p. 709 ff., for example,
pleading that greater importance should be accorded to the point of view of
victims and of their concrete experiences (in comparison with that accorded by
Courts to expert proofs and statistics) inevitably relies on a renewed confidence
in the practical art of judging.
[35] This thesis is developed by the Italian philosopher of law Laura Palazzani
and by Justice Marta Cartabia of Italian Constitutional Court in some of their
works.
[36] C.S. Sunstein famously stated that equality ‘is’ anti-caste principle.
Sunstein is right when he argues that, being ‘anti-caste principle’, equality is the
business of the legislator and of the administration and the judiciary must
follow (Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do, p. 155 ff.). But: is the
anti-caste principle all what equality means? Thinking like so entails a typical,
realistically reductive, vision of law.
[37] “Look Sir! The Revolution does not do always wrong. Such a flat and
uniform surface! Richelieu would had loved it” was the comment of a French
noble man to King Louis XVI about equality (abolition of statuses) being
realized by the Revolution, Alexis de Tocqueville reports in his celebrated The
Old Regime and the Revolution (1856).
[38] I mean with this word what is unjust, unfair, abusive, including tort.
[39] EU anti-discrimination law paradigmatically  serves many protected
grounds a recipe which is always the same (enhancing their propensity to job).
A. Somek argues that this is discriminatory (in that, for example,  the western
career oriented way of life is dictated to minorities that have different values). I
would say it is contrary to the basic principle ‘to each his own’ (and thereby
premised on the idea that what people really want, or think, or is, is irrelevant).
[40] I am thinking to R. Siegel’s Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects:
The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action (1997), online at
digitalcommons.law.yale.edu.
[41] M.A. Fineman, Beyond Identities, in Emory University School of Law,
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, on line at  ssrn.com.
[42] For France, where the universalistic mantra of ‘marriage for all’ was the
winning one, but strongly contested by some part of the homosexual opinion,
see G. Rebucini, Mariage pour tous et emancipation sexuelle, pour une autre
strategie politique, 2012, on line at academia.edu; M. Boucai, Sexual Liberty
and Same-Sex Marriage: An Argument from Bisexuality, in San Diego Law
Rev., 2012, p. 415 also makes some interesting points on the issue.
[43] Which is the thesis that M. Sandel argues in Justice.
[44] I have discussed this point more in depht in Il dibattito intorno alla svolta
universalistica e dignitaria del diritto antidiscriminatorio, in Dir. e  Soc., 2014,
p. 313 ff.
[45] See  nt. 15 above.
[46]    These words are of the German feminist theologist Ina Praetorius.
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